A new model for the reform of the UN Security Council

By Jule Goikoetxea

The UN’s most important executive organ is the Security Council (SC), whose reform has become a highly controversial issue over last decade. In this article I shall propose a new composition aimed at better satisfying the calls for an equitable representation and distribution of power within the SC, which would further enhance its legitimacy.

The Council was set up to be an effective mechanism for maintaining international peace and security; but the latter, as the UN itself claims, may involve issues as diverse as preventive measures to avert an imminent war; promoting human rights; and economic and social development. Consequently, perceptions of illegitimacy may arise both from failure to use authority effectively as in Kosovo or Iraq and from the abuse of authority, as in Liberia or Afghanistan. Thus, criticisms have arisen because it seems that some interventions and sanctions are imposed in line with the interests of the great powers of the Council (US, Russia or the UK), which is an expression of the failure of the SC to use authority effectively. I should say that this unequal treatment arises mainly out of the inequitable representation and, hence, distribution of power within the SC, vis-à-vis the current power realities on the international scene.

Indeed, in December 2004, the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel affirmed that the composition of the Council reflects neither the real international influence of states, nor the size of their contribution to the UN, and called for a more equitable representation. Japan and Germany are not permanent members but their contributions are the second and third largest respectively, after the US’. Other states like India and Brazil have cited not only their population but also their large contribution to peacekeeping operations around the world. Therefore, it is reasonably argued that any reform should increase the involvement in decision-making not only of those who comprise large populations but also of those who contribute most to the UN financially and militarily.

US President Obama chairs a 2009 UN Security Council summit (Credit: UN Photo/Erin Siegal, www.unmultimedia.org/photo/)

However, reflecting new power realities does not mean that representation on the SC would be democratic, since one indicator of these power realities is economic power, which still remains unevenly distributed. The Permanent members of the SC – US, China, Russia, UK and France – are still some of the largest economies in the world. That is why representation should be understood by reference to the new power realities and not to democratic representation. As the Secretary-General’s report (Annan, 2005:168) and the High-level Panel (2004) acknowledged, legitimacy comes from efficiency and effectiveness as much as, or more than, from equity. Moreover, both reports endorse the Responsibility to Protect doctrine which means “a more proactive, interventionist stance by the Council in cases of egregious mistreatment of a population” (Luck, 2005:6). Consequently, the key question is over whether the proposal of the Panel (2004) to add nine members would broaden the scope for Council action, making it more efficient and effective, or alternatively whether it would make the Council a democratic organism. And it seems that it would achieve neither of these goals.

Currently the five permanent members have veto power and represent 1910 million people. The non-permanent members were expanded to ten in 1965 and are elected for two-year terms. At least four non-permanent members must vote in favour of a resolution for it to pass. Five of the non-permanent seats are allocated to Africa and Asia, two each to Latin America and Western Europe, and one to Eastern Europe. Model A (proposed by the High-Level Panel in 2004) provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year-term non-permanent seats. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent seat. In my opinion, both models over-represent Europe and under-represent Asia and Africa insofar as they give the same number of seats to each of them. These enlargements would reproduce the current distribution of power between member states – mainly, because the permanent five would be the same and, furthermore, the stability of the Council would be highly precarious due to either its reduced permanent membership (Model B) or the large number of non-permanent members (Model A), which implies a continuous turnover of actors and hence the impossibility of making or agreeing on long-term strategies.

Based on what has been said about the root causes of the Council’s perceived illegitimacy, I think the solution depends on a more equitable distribution of the permanent and semi-permanent seats. A reform that introduced more equitable representation would make the Council not more democratic per se, but more balanced. In order to change the balance of power among the member states, the new representation would have to establish another relationship whereby the great powers on the one hand, and the medium-sized and small ones on the other, would hold one another in check, thereby guaranteeing a more equitable distribution of power. This would balance some states’ vulnerability to being intervened in or having sanctions imposed on them against others’. It would thus offset the amount of clout, not just belonging to the great powers in relation to the smaller ones, but also of the great powers amongst themselves.  Although the SC’s legitimacy comes from its member states, it has been shown that the principle whereby states agree to hand over part of their sovereignty does not apply equally. Some states are, de facto, more sovereign than others – which is, in my opinion, what has led the SC to be seen as illegitimate: unrepresentative and abusive at times, ineffective at other times.

An alternative Model I: New Permanent members with veto power

For information related to RB and PO see: <www.globalpolicy.org.> (2009)

An alternative Model II: New members of the SC without veto

Source: <www.cia.gov> (2009) and Population Reference Bureau (World Population                     Data Sheet, 2008).

In this new composition the permanent members with veto power would represent 3479 million people. However, the ability to act would not be impaired and therefore efficiency would remain the highest priority along with representation of current power realities.

India’s inclusion is justified by its population and contribution. It is the third largest contributor of troops to the UN after Pakistan and Bangladesh (www.globalpolicy.org>, 2009). Furthermore, it is the world’s twelfth largest economy and the fourth largest in terms of purchasing power parity.

The EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN regular budget, funding over two-fifths of UN peacekeeping operations and providing around half of all UN member states’ contributions to UN funds and programmes (ibid.). Through the establishment of the EU’s common foreign and security policy in 1992, EU Member States have enhanced the coordination of their actions within international organizations and have undertaken to maintain common positions in such forums in order to give greater impact to their collective weight in the world. As the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy becomes a daily reality, the activities of its members who sit on the SC increasingly take account of the EU’s political positions.

As regards those members without veto power, I propose three kinds of membership: permanent, semi-permanent and non-permanent. Remember that the contribution of peacekeeping forces to the UN is along with population and financial contribution one of the main criteria for gaining a permanent or semi-permanent seat. The new composition would affect the distribution of power that currently dominates the SC, redistributing it more equitably and in order to ensure stability non-permanent members are being reduced, while the permanent and semi-permanent ones increase – although introducing a rotation system in order to strengthen regional representation. Africa, for instance, would have two semi-permanent seats whereby South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt would defend not just their own interests but also the common regional interests that are at the same time shared by the countries that make up the African Union. The tendency of semi-permanent seat holders to defend their common regional interests would be boosted by the fact that it is the interests of a particular region, and not of a particular country, that would have a permanent presence on the Council. This kind of membership allows mobility, which implies bargaining and yielding; but it entails a greater commitment amongst the states that occupy the same seat or pertain to the same bloc. In this way, the semi-permanent seats would enable long-term agreements and would consolidate common regional interests while introducing a balance between the great powers within each region.

As regards permanent seats, the balancing of power would be introduced differently. The EU’s seat would entail increasing its accountability to all its member states, but also curtailing its member states’ sovereignty – such that the UK and Spain, for instance, could not wage any war, such as in Iraq, without the authority of the Union, who would have to approve it in the SC.

Turning now to Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, it shares many common interests not just with Argentina, but also with the other countries in the region (as is shown by Mercosur). Nevertheless, Brazil would have to bargain constantly with Mexico in order to decide which way to vote on specific resolutions that would damage them (for instance, under their agreement on new trade relations and technological investments) – thereby creating a sort of balance of power that would strengthen their accountability to one other and enhance regional representation.

This model would provide Africa with five seats – two more than Europe and one more than the Americas. The reason for this is not merely population, but also the fact that Africa would not have any permanent seat. Thus, the more permanent seats and veto power a region has, the fewer total seats it has. And the bigger a region’s population is, the more seats it is allocated overall.

The new seats of Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Japan would introduce both the representation Asia deserves in terms of population and contribution to the UN and the balance necessary for a more equitable distribution of power. However, some fundamental geopolitical changes would have to be made in order for India to be accepted by China. Any agreement to accept India would have to provide a solution to the problem of the Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns, and the Pakistani Muslims of Kashmir, which has given rise to a never-ending war between Pakistan and India which destabilize and affects China directly.

With regard to the EU seat, it is from the UK that the fiercest opposition would come; but based on the latter’s contribution to the UN, its population and its regional position, its seat does not seem justified. Moreover, taking into account the recent appointment of Baroness Ashton as High Representative for Foreign Affairs, it seems the EU is trying to strengthen British diplomacy in order to convert it into the EU’s diplomatic infrastructure. If the British diplomatic service became European, the UK would have a strong incentive to accept a united voice for the advantage that the UK would gain in terms of influencing other countries and promoting its own interests.

As noted earlier, any enlargement would never democratically represent all the UN member states. However, by introducing semi-permanent and permanent memberships that enhance the representation of current power realities without detracting from efficiency, the SC’s legitimacy would definitely increase.

A few decades ago no one could have imagined the current European Union. Similarly, no one knows what the UN will be like in a few decades’ time. Nonetheless, if world peace and security are to be safeguarded by a worldwide collective security organism, the United Nations and its Security Council – not each individual state – must have the monopoly when it comes to interpreting a given action as just and procedurally fair. This is what legitimacy ultimately depends on.

Dr. Jule Goikoetxea is based at St. Edmunds College, Cambridge.

By Lorne Neudorf

UN Human Rights Council March 2010 (Credit: US Mission Geneva Photo/Eric Bridiers)

As an intra-governmental body comprised of more than 190 member states, the United Nations (the “UN”) is the most prominent and broadly representative advocate of human rights in the world today.  The UN was designed following the Second World War as an institution to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” with a purpose established by its Charter to include “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms”.   As part of its mandate to advance the cause of human rights, the UN encourages reforms to the laws and legal institutions of its member states and lends technical assistance in implementing these reforms.  Much of this work focuses on courts.  The importance of courts to the UN can be explained by understanding the role of courts in enforcing laws.  By hearing claims brought by individuals against the state, courts possess the unique institutional capacity to review executive and legislative action in order to ensure compliance with legal rights and provide a remedy for a violation.  This rights review function of the courts is seen as an integral feature of the rule of law because it ensures the compliance of state officials with their legal obligations: nobody is above the law, not even the state itself.  From the UN’s perspective, rights review by judges is critical to the enforcement of human rights because it gives effect to these legal guarantees that otherwise simply exist on paper.  In the absence of judicial oversight, state officials might be tempted to subject citizens to unlawful treatment for their own ends.  The potential for human rights violations is perceived as especially significant in the context of developing countries where political instability and power imbalances provide opportunities for abuse.

The difficulty with this view of courts as enforcers of human rights is that courts and judges are inherently tied to the state.  Judges are civil servants, normally appointed by and paid for by the state.  As such, courts are unlikely to enforce human rights against the state if they fear backlash from powerful interests for their decisions.  In seeking to strengthen the individual and collective independence of the judiciary, the UN recognises the vulnerable position of judges reviewing state action in cases that place the enforcement of human rights squarely against the interests of the governing regime.  For example, the UN advocates that countries guarantee the right to a fair trial by an independent tribunal in criminal cases: Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, establishes that any criminally accused shall be provided with a “fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”.  Criminal trials are of special concern to the UN given that they involve the bulk of the interaction between individuals and the state and allegations of human rights violations are often raised in the context of a criminal proceeding.  Furthermore, the criminally accused is seen as especially vulnerable in the absence of an independent judiciary because the state may have a vested interest in obtaining a conviction but the accused has little choice but to rely upon state institutions to assess his or her criminal liability.

In 1985, the General Assembly confirmed the importance of the principle of judicial independence to the protection of human rights when it endorsed the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (the “Basic Principles”).   In twenty sections, the Basic Principles sets out a series of institutional arrangements that seek to protect judges from sources of improper interference in their role as protectors of fundamental human rights and freedoms.  The preamble states that the Basic Principles were “formulated to assist Member States in their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary [and] should be taken into account and respected by Governments”.  While the preamble notes that the principles are to be implemented within “national legislation and practice”, a number of the principles consist of specific obligations that are seen as necessary to protect judges from improper interference.  For example, Section 1 obligates countries to guarantee the independence of the judiciary in their constitutions or domestic law.  Other sections prescribe requirements relating to the preservation of the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, the conditions of judicial service and tenure, judicial secrecy in deliberations, judicial immunity, and limitations on the discipline, suspension, or removal of judges from office.  Notably, the Basic Principles does not limit itself to these measures of independence.  Instead, it takes an unqualified view of judicial independence by stating that judges must be free from “any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason”.

Since the endorsement of the Basic Principles, a number of countries have implemented legal guarantees to protect the independence of the judiciary.  However, a serious problem has since emerged: many judges continue to experience attacks on their independence in violation of these guarantees.  In 1994, the UN appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers through its Commission on Human Rights to investigate.  This appointment was extended in 2008 by the Human Rights Council for a period of three years when it noted “with concern the increasingly frequent attacks on the independence of judges”.  The Special Rapporteur, presently Brazilian judge Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva, is empowered by the Human Rights Council to inquire into alleged violations of judicial independence in member states, publish reports, and to make recommendations to improve the independence of courts.  Notably, the reports of the Special Rapporteur provide a rich source of country-specific information on alleged violations of judicial independence.  These reports have revealed a significant gap between guarantees of judicial independence in law and the situation on the ground, especially in developing states.  For example, in the addendum to the 2009 Report, Special Rapporteur Leandro Despouy summarised alleged violations in forty-five economically developing countries, representing more than 85 percent of the total number of countries investigated.   Of those, 77 percent were middle income countries as classified by the World Bank.  In the attached summary of his Report, the Special Rapporteur notes that he “witnessed that the independence of the judiciary, which is crucial to democratic governance, is at risk in all parts of the world and that key actors in this field are the targets of innumerable sorts of attacks affecting their professional and personal integrity.”

While important progress has undoubtedly been made as a result of the Basic Principles, the wide gap between legal protections of judicial independence and the actual situation on the ground as evidenced by the Reports of the Special Rapporteur suggests that a new approach to judicial independence in developing countries is needed.  It is now clear that in many cases the reason for the lack of independent courts is not due to the absence of formal legal guarantees that protect judges.  Yet, the promotion of further legal reforms to protect judges from improper influence seems to be the preferred approach of the UN going forward as noted in the 2009 Report of the Special Rapporteur.  With the appointment of the Special Rapporteur coming to its conclusion this year, the UN will be presented with a timely opportunity to recognise the shortcomings of its existing approach to promoting independent courts.  It is hoped the Human Rights Council seizes this opportunity to further extend the appointment of the Special Rapporteur and mandates the investigation of a new approach to judicial independence in the developing world: one that takes a more nuanced view of the function of judges and courts in economic and social progress and considers the unique context of each country on its path to development.

Lorne Neudorf is a Canadian lawyer accredited as a non-governmental organisation representative with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.  Lorne is also a doctoral research student in law at the University of Cambridge.  His doctoral research considers the principle of judicial independence in the developing world, and he has published in a number of law journals and texts.

“The Big Society: Rhetoric or Reality”

Baroness Blood MBE is a Labour Member of the House of Lords. The first  woman in Northern Ireland to gain a life peerage and seat in the House of  Lords, she has worked throughout her life as a celebrated trade union and  community activist. Her political interests include women’s issues, working  class issues, and integrated education. Baroness Blood will be reflecting  on her own involvement in politics and the current political climate.

Date: 15th February

Time: 5.30pm

Location: Bateman auditorium, Gonville and Caius College.

CUUNA is delighted to announce our first talk of 2011 by the Director of the Overseas Development Institute, Dr Alison Evans. She is an economist (and she completed her MPhil in Cambridge) specialising on poverty, public policy, institutional change and the role of international development assistance.

Her talk is titled: The countdown to 2015 and then what? The Millennium Development Goals in a rapidly changing global context

She will come and address us on January the 25th in King’s College’s Munby Room from 5.30 pm-7.00pm.

Later this term Baroness Blood will also be visiting us. Time and title TBC.

We are proud to invite you all to our event marking International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women this Thursday. We are hosting Steve Matthews from the White Ribbon campaign and Haliki Voolma, as well as screening a new documentary on rape in the Congo.

What? International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women
When? Thursday 25th November 5pm-6.30pm
Where? Bateman Auditorium, Caius
-Steve Matthews from the White Ribbon Campaign
-Screening of a UN documentary about rape in the Congo
-Talk by Haliki Voolma on domestic violence

Join us in what will be a most informative and thought-provoking event.

Dear all CUUNA members and non-members,

Next week is  the Campaign week for CUUNA. The Campaign theme this year is “International day against violence against women”. We are very lucky to have representatives from the White Ribbon to come and speak to us on Thursday, 25th November. Venue and Time for the talk will be confirmed shortly.

We have the pleasure of inviting all our members (and some non-members) to formal dinner at Downing College after the talk, where we will have an opportunity to talk more informally with the guest speakers.

It is going to be a 3 course meal with no wine, and the price is 16.49 pounds for members and 18.50 for non-members. It might seem a little costly but it is really worth it, as food tends to be much nicer at private events. To book you tickets use the link and form in this email to pay and reserve your seat. 

Do let Vincent know if you are intending to bring in your own wine, as special arrangements is required.

BOOKING OPENS NOW AND CLOSES AT WEDNESDAY MIDNIGHT. Fill in your name, college and dietary requirements.

Please go to: http://groupspaces.com/cuuna/item/94988

We hope to see many of you there.

We are proud to invite you all to our next event of the term, a careers event open to CUUNA members only.

“Personal Reflections on working for the UN”
Date: Monday 8th November
Time: 4-5pm
Location: Judge Business School
CUUNA members only

In collaboration with the Cambridge University Careers Service, CUUNA bring you a range of UN employees, many with field experience, who will discuss their life and work working for this institution. For all of you considering a career in the UN, this will be an invaluable opportunity to hear some insider stories and obtain some useful advice on career opportunties.

If you wish to attend please logon to the careers service website (http ://www . careers . cam . ac . uk/index . asp) and sign up for this event.

Also, we would like to draw attention to the other parallel events on the same day at the Careers Service:

“Working at the UN: for undergraduates”
Date: Monday 8th November
Time: 2.30-3.30pm
Location: Mill Lane Lecture Rooms, Room 1
Open to all, no booking necessary

“Working at the UN: for MBAs and postgrads”
Date: Monday 8th November
Time: 5-8.30pm
Location: Judge Business School
Booking necessary- see careers service website for details.

We hope many of you will make the time to come to some of these events.

The Cambridge University United Nations Association is proud to be hosting Sir Robert Worcester on Wednesday evening in King’s College, Keynes Hall. The Chairman and Founder of MORI (Market & Opinion Research International), he is the best known pollster in Britain and one of the most quoted political analysts in the world. He was made a Freeman of the City of London in 2001 and named Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (KBE) in February 2005.

He will be giving a talk entitled: “Public Opinion about the UN, and the state of the British political scene”.

Not to be missed!

When: Wednesday 27th October
Time: 6.15pm
Where: Keyne’s Hall, King’s College

The Cambridge University United Nations Association would like to invite old and new, members and soon-to-be-members to our fascinatingly exciting squash this Monday. If you ant to know more about CUUNA and what we do you should come to the Munby Room in King’s College (the one with the very big chapel). We have even prepared a special UN Team Quiz!

Come at 7 and stay long! Drinks and nibbles will be served!

CUUNA Squash Poster

Representatives from the CUUNA committee will be at stall C17 during the whole of Tuesday the 5th and Wednesday the 6th of this week. Come and chat to us about CUUNA and the UN. We have a very exiting term planned!

More info from CUSU: http://www.cusu.cam.ac.uk/societies/